Desire as Belief: A Study of Desire, Motivation, and Rationality
Alex Gregory
What is it to want something? Or, as philosophers might ask, what is a desire? This book defends ‘desire-as-belief’, the view that desires are just a special subset of our beliefs: normative beliefs. This view entitles us to accept orthodox models of human motivation and rationality that explain those things with reference to desire, but nonetheless to also make room for our normative beliefs to play a role in those domains. And this view tells us to diverge from the orthodox view on which desires themselves can never be right or wrong. Rather, according to desire-as-belief, our desires can themselves be assessed for their accuracy, and they are wrong when they misrepresent normative features of the world. Hume says that it is not contrary to reason to prefer the destruction of the whole world to the scratching of your finger, but he is wrong: it is foolish to prefer the destruction of the whole world to the scratching of your finger, and this is foolish because this preference misrepresents the relative worth of these things.
درجه (قاطیغوری(:
کال:
2021
خپرندویه اداره:
Oxford University Press
ژبه:
english
ISBN 10:
2020952661
ISBN 13:
9782020952668
فایل:
PDF, 1.12 MB
IPFS:
,
english, 2021